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Rationale for a Mini-Symposium on Kant on Cognition
Kant’s position in the history of philosophy is unique in that despite their 
radically different methods, terminologies, and positions, many of the most 
important schools of thought in both analytic and continental philosophy 
over the past two hundred years have, in one way or another, a common 
source in Kant and are reactions to Kant. One popular point of departure in 
Kant has been his assertion of synthetic a priori cognition, where much 
attention has been paid both to the analytic-synthetic distinction (e.g. in the 
logical positivists and Quine) and to the possibility of what, if anything, can 
be established a priori (e.g. in Philip Kitcher, Richard Rorty, Lawrence Bonjour
and, again, Quine). Surprisingly, much less explicit attention has been paid 
to the third crucial term, cognition (Erkenntnis), and to exactly how it is to be
understood. 
It has been quite common to take cognition in Kant to be more or less 
equivalent to knowledge, and hence to interpret Kant as an arch-
epistemologist, responsible for synthesizing the rationalist and empiricist 
epistemological traditions.  This view was perhaps especially encouraged by 
Norman Kemp Smith’s influential English translation of the first Critique, 
which translated both ‘Wissen’ and ‘Erkenntnis’ as knowledge. Now, if 
‘Erkenntnis’ just is knowledge, then Kemp Smith is correct, but by not 
marking the different terms, he made it impossible for English readers to 
decide for themselves whether cognition and knowledge might be distinct.  
Other more recent interpretations have picked up on the possibility that 
Kant’s focus is, at the very least, much broader than knowledge, with Sellars,
McDowell and Brandom for example, and also German Kant-scholars such as 
Gerold Prauss, arguing that Kant’s basic interest in the Critique of Pure 
Reason lies in developing a theory of intentionality (grounded in normative 
vocabulary). 
While there is much to recommend in this broadening of perspectives, 
what is still lacking from these discussions, and what would help decide 
among competing interpretations, is a more focused analysis of what Kant 
says about cognition in particular. Since the primary focus of the first 
Critique is on investigating the possibility of synthetic a priori cognition, a 
proper understanding of the very subject matter of this seminal work, along 
with its most basic argument, hangs on a proper answer to this question.
In light of this situation, what is needed is a sustained investigation of 
the nature of cognition in Kant that is based on detailed textual exegesis and
careful philosophical argument. Moreover, it would be helpful to have not 
simply one more scholar’s particular perspective, but contributions from 
several scholars with different philosophical perspectives, exegetical 
frameworks, and historical sensitivities. Eric Watkins and Marcus Willaschek 
(Professors of Philosophy at UCSD and the Goethe Universität Frankfurt, 
respectively) have jointly written a paper, titled “Kant on Cognition and 
Knowledge” that provides a cohesive argument showing that and why 
cognition, for Kant, must be distinct from knowledge, both as he understood 
it and as it has traditionally been understood (as justified true belief). They 
argue, instead, that cognition is a mental state through which one is aware 
of the existence and (at least some of the) general features of objects. Unlike
knowledge, it does not require either an act of assent or (an objectively 
sufficient) justification.
Further, Clinton Tolley (Associate Professor at UCSD) has written a 
paper, titled “Kant on the Place of Cognition in the Progression of our 
Representations”, that analyzes cognition from the point of view of the 
broader systematic context of Kant’s philosophy of mind. Tolley argues that 
Kant thinks of cognition as occupying a particular, intermediate place within 
a ‘progression’ (Stufenleiter) of our mind’s representational activities.  This 
runs from basic sensory representations, through consciousness of them, to 
the cognition of real objects through these sensory representations, and then
from here on up to highly complex rational systematic knowledge. In this 
way, he illuminates the exact nature of cognition itself, by showing how it 
differs both from knowledge but also from other mental representations 
(such as sensation, intuition, perception, consciousness).
By arguing in these distinct, but complementary ways for the 
difference between cognition and knowledge and for thinking of cognition 
primarily in representational, and less in epistemological terms, these two 
papers make a significant contribution not only to Kant scholarship, but also 
to clarifying a foundational issue that is still very much alive in contemporary
philosophy.
 
